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Abstract 
Following the discovery of the pre-salt petroleum fields, Brazil changed the regulatory framework of 
the oil industry upstream. Its main objectives are three-fold: (i) increasing the government take; (ii) 
mitigating the oil curse; (iii) developing the national oil industry. The paper attempts to ‘ex-ante’ 
assess whether the instruments of the new framework (e.g., the change in the oil regime, the creation 
of a social fund, the exclusive E&P rights to Petrobras) will be able to achieve these objectives (i.e., 
goal effectiveness) and whether the costs they entail are lower than their benefits (i.e., welfare 
increase). Our assessment shows that the new regulatory regime is likely to succeed. 
In this paper we identify what are the objectives of the new regulatory framework through the analysis 
of government and policy-makers declaration. We describe the instruments that the new regulatory 
framework contain to achieve the objectives. We examine whether the instruments seem well-suited to 
face the objectives. Moreover, by taking into account also the costs of the instruments, we wonder 
whether the welfare is likely to increase. And then, we identify some open issues regarding the 
implementation that may strongly impact the welfare. 
This paper is a prospective analysis and there are still some key open elements about how the new 
regulatory framework will be implemented. We cannot forecast the future but we show that it is likely 
that the goals will be achieved and this achievement is likely to be welfare improving. 
Keywords 
Energy policy, Regulatory oil regime, Production Sharing Agreement, Oil&Gas industry. 
 1 
Introduction 
Following the discovery of the pre-salt petroleum fields, Brazil has changed the regulatory framework 
of the oil upstream. The paper is devoted to assess ‘ex-ante’ whether the instruments of the new 
framework will be able to achieve the objectives. The starting point is thus to identify such objectives. 
To do so, besides the review of the existent bibliography, laws and regulation, the paper builds on a 
series of interviews carried out in Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia (February 2012). We interviewed around 
30 experts in the oil industry, including academics, oil companies, consulting companies, government, 
regulators and politicians. The new oil Brazilian regime is still not implemented and most of the issues 
are still under discussion. In that view, interviews played a key role in this research. Actually, the 
interviews are used to collect information as well as to analyse the views of the different players of the 
Brazilian oil industry. Thus, we identify the objectives of the new regulatory framework through the 
analysis of government and policy-makers declarations. 
We conclude that the new framework’s objective is threefold: (i) increasing the government take; 
(ii) mitigating the oil curse; (iii) developing the national oil industry. The reasoning behind this paper 
is to analyse first the adequacy of the instruments to achieve their goals, and second whether the costs 
they entail are lower than their benefits. Our assessment shows that the new regulatory regime is likely 
to succeed. 
Aiming to increase the government take, a new oil regime has been implemented. Brazil used to 
have typical concession regime, but under the new law the Pre-salt fields should be explored under the 
production sharing agreement (PSA) regime. The oil regime defines the kind of contract that the 
government signs with the oil companies to explore and produce. The concession is a type of lease 
contract, which grants an oil company rights to explore, develop, sell and export oil extracted from a 
specified area for a fixed period of time. On the other hand, the PSA is a type of contract where the 
state retains ownership of the resources and negotiates a sharing of profits. The key for increasing the 
government take is the definition of the amount of such profit sharing. 
To promote national oil industry, different instruments (old and new) are put into place. The new 
regulatory framework may still use local content clauses. This instrument has been used in the last 
years, although their results are not conclusive yet. In addition, a new instrument will be included to 
the Pre-salt era: Petrobras as single operator. Petrobras is a publicly traded corporation, but the Federal 
Government is the majority stockholder of the Corporation's voting capital
1
. In that view, the use of 
Petrobras to guarantee the investment in national content is seen as a key instrument to drive the 
development of the national industry. 
The third objective concerns the oil curse. We will use the term to group two different dimensions 
of potential drawbacks related to oil exploration. Oil is an international commodity that may strongly 
impact on the exchange rate and hence it might be a case for the so-called Dutch disease. On the other 
hand, oil resources may be misused causing distortions in the economic incentives. The new 
regulatory framework aims to create rules to constraint the use of oil resources and to reduce the 
heterogeneity among the income received by different States and Municipalities. To mitigate the oil 
curse, two new mechanisms to allocate the government take have been put in place. First, a ‘Social 
Fund’ was created to manage the Union oil funds. Second, there is a project to shift the resource 
sharing among the Union, the states and the cities. These two new instruments aim to find the measure 
and the mechanism to distribute rent avoiding economic crowd-out effects, and thus to control the oil 
curse. 
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 The Company's shares are common shares with voting rights and preferred shares with no voting rights forever. The 
government control the common shares of Petrobras stocks, controlling the Corporation’s voting capital, (Petrobras, 
2012).  
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In order to coordinate these three pillars, the government will count on institutions involved in 
three different phases of the oil production decision-making process: before the oil fields are in the 
market, the Conselho Nacional de Política Energética (CNPE); the process of marketing the 
exploration/production rights, the Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis 
(ANP) and the exploration and production phase for which a new body is created, the Empresa 
Brasileira de Administração de Petróleo e Gás Natural S.A (PPSA). 
This paper is a prospective analysis and there are still some opened elements about how the new 
regulatory framework will be implemented. We cannot forecast the future but we show that one might 
be optimistic that the goals will be achieved. Moreover, this achievement is likely to be welfare-
improving. And in particular we identify the key conditions to make this scenario likely. 
In section 1, we show the instruments that the new regulatory framework contain to achieve the 
objectives. The analysis of the three objectives is detailed in the section 2 (government take), section 3 
(oil industry development) and section 4 (avoiding oil curse). We analyse whether the instruments 
seem well-suited to face the objectives and if it is likely to increase the social welfare. Moreover we 
identify some open issues regarding the implementation that may strongly impact the welfare. Finally 
section 5 collects our conclusions. 
1. The new regulatory framework in a nutshell 
The transformation in the Brazilian regulatory framework is still undergoing. In any case, we 
summarize the changes in the regulatory framework by identifying two levels: the change in the law, 
and the transposition to the corresponding regulatory bodies and contracts. We analyse here the 
changes in the law (by studying the main laws and law’s project related to the new oil regulatory 
framework), and how the industry players and decision-makers are likely to interpret the law (by 
considering the set of interviews with key players in the industry). It allows us to understand the 
possible paths for the implementation of the new regulatory framework.  
We identify the new regulatory framework with four new laws. Three of them are already approved 
in 2010, Law 12.276, Law 12.304 and Law 12.351 and the last one was finally promulgated in March 
2013 Law 12.734
 2.
 
The first of this set of laws allowed the Brazilian government to onerously offer to Petrobras the 
exploration and production of oil and other hydrocarbon fluids without any public tender 
(Law_12.276, 2010). This law was the first step for leaving the pure concession regime, established in 
the Law 9.478 which guaranteed equivalent conditions to all oil companies in the bids (Law_9.478, 
1997)
3
. This law was important to allow Petrobras capitalization, as the government used this 
instrument to buy Petrobras shares and thus to keep the control of the company shares (Lima, 2011). 
The second law signed in August 2010 allowed the creation of the PPSA, a public enterprise to 
manage the government side of the oil contracts (Law_12.304, 2010). This a new governmental 
company will focus on defending the government interests in the contracts with other oil companies. 
This law was the step before the inclusion of the profit sharing agreement (PSA regime) in the 
subsequent law (Law_12.351, 2010). 
The law 12.351 is the main pillar of the new regulatory framework. First, by the introduction of the 
PSA regime, it changes the oil regime in Brazil from a pure concession regime to mixed regime that 
includes the PSA for pre-salt area. Second, it introduces the rule that Petrobras is the unique operator 
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3
 We may note in the law the exploration and production could be done through authorization, however there is not further 
detail on this mechanism and it was not applied. 
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of the projects in the pre-salt area. And third, it creates the Social Fund, a mechanism to allocate the 
government take. 
The fourth law, modify the division of royalties and special participation among the Union, the 
states and the municipalities (Law_12.734, 2012)
4
. 
1.1 Regulatory background  
Until 1995, Petrobras, a national company founded in 1953 and controlled by the federal government, 
held monopoly rights of oil exploration and production in Brazil, (Matoso et al., 2011). The 
constitutional amendment 09/95 ended the Petrobras monopoly, but the concession regulatory 
framework was established in 1997. It opened the oil activity (including exploration and production) 
to private firms, created the National Petroleum Agency (ANP – Agencia Nacional de Petróleo, Gás 
Natural e Biocombustível)
5
 and created the National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE- Conselho 
Nacional de Política Enrgética)
6
 (Bucheb, 2007). The regulatory framework adopted under this model 
and still in vigor for bigger part of petroleum production can be summarized as a concession regime 
which the licenses are auctioned by the regulatory body. The licensing auctions had three criterions: 
the bonus value, the exploration scheduling and the amount of national contents. 
“Since 1998, the Brazilian petroleum regulatory agency has been hosting licensing rounds for 
leasing acreage for petroleum exploration rights right under a concession regime. The adopted 
model is competitive sealed bid auctions, in which the winner is the oil company presenting not 
only higher cash bonus, but also committing an expressive exploration program and a percentage 
of local content in services and operation to be applied in both the exploratory and production 
development phases”, (Rodriguez et al., 2009, page 6). 
In this regulatory framework all enterprises have the same rights and duties, there were no separation 
between national and foreign enterprises. The government intervention was limited to the model 
choice (i.e., what are the variables that the enterprises should bid in the auctions?) and also in the 
choices of the regions which will be offered in the concession auctions. In this framework the 
government player is the CNPE. It is worth to note that after the concession is auctioned there were no 
room for further government intervention. The ANP as a public authority had the role to oversee the 
contracts enforcements and penalize the enterprises deviating from the contract. 
In this context, Petrobras was still the most important player in the Brazilian oil industry but a 
number of competitors entered into the Brazilian oil industry. There is relevant bibliography analyzing 
and discussing the results of the licensing rounds, for instance (Matoso, et al., 2011 and Rodriguez, et 
al., 2009)
7
.  
                                                     
4
 The original law project was law 448, (Law_Project_448, 2011), The law project was proposed by the senate and 
approved by the Brazilian’s deputies, but first there was a Veto from the president and it was just in March 2013 that the 
law was finally promulgated.  
5
 (Law_9.478, 1997) 
6
 The CNPE is a President advisory body. Its function is to formulate energy policies and guidelines to promote rational 
use of Brazil energy resources; ensure the supply of energy to remote areas (or with difficult access); periodically review 
the primary energy mix, establish guidelines for specific energy programs, to establish guidelines for the import, export 
and storage of fossil fuels, (MME, 2012) 
7
 Despite of the key role of Petrobras in these rounds there is no conclusive work that shows Petrobras anti-competitive 
behavior. Nevertheless, there is some evidences that Petrobras has more information than others players because of its 
position as monopolist for over 40 years. For more see (Hernades-Perez, 2011). Moreover, as consequence of the 
historical dominant position of Petrobras, scale economy and learning effects can also explain the position of the 
company in the biddings results. 
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1.2 New regulatory framework 
On November 8, 2007, the state-owned Petrobras announced that it had discovered a huge reserve of 
light oil in the Tupi pre-salt field in the Santos basin. Following this first discovery, other subsequent 
discoveries were made in the pre-salt area, as the Campos and Espirito Santo fields
8
. Considering all 
the discoveries in pre-salt area up to 2011, ANP estimates 30 billions
9
 of barrels of oil in new pre-salt 
reserves
10
. The magnitude of the new discoveries has led the policy-makers to re-think the role of oil 
in the Brazilian economy as well as to re-structure the industry regulatory framework.  
On August, 31, 2009, the federal government proposed to the Brazilian Congress a new regulatory 
framework for the exploration and production (E&P) of the oil industry for a subarea of the Pre-salt 
area (and other areas to be considered strategic). 
In this paper we first define the three objectives of the new regulatory framework, second we 
identify the relevant instruments designed to fulfill such objectives. Then, we analyze whether the 
instruments are adequate, from a qualitative point of view, to implement the corresponding pillar of 
the Brazilian policy. Comparing with the former framework, it is possible to highlight the following 
key new instruments: 
(i) The inclusion of the profit sharing agreement (PSA) as Pre-salt oil regime (instead of concession). 
This kind of contract increases the risk of the government since the government shares the profits, 
so there is not guaranteed revenue. However, it might improve the amount of government take  
(ii) The creation of PPSA represents a shift from the absence of state intervention after the contract 
signature to its participation in the decisions of exploration and production (i.e. the inclusion of 
PPSA in the consortia opens a room for State intervention after the contract signature). This 
measure may reinforce the three pillars of the Brazilian objectives, because it ensures the ex post 
bargaining position of the State. It may help to assure the local content clauses, may help to 
minimize costs increasing government take and also may help a better production scheduling the 
production to avoid the drawbacks associated with exchanges rate impact (Dutch disease). 
(iii) The monopoly of Petrobras in the operation of all the Pre-Salt fields was established. Moreover, a 
minimum participation that Petrobras should have in each project (30%) becomes also mandatory 
(Law_12.276, 2010, Law_12.351, 2010). This implies a move from equivalent role of all the oil 
enterprises to differentiated position of. This instrument is associated with the policy of 
reinforcing the national sector. With the minimum participation, Petrobras ensures its involvement 
in every project of exploration and production. With the monopoly in the operation, Petrobras 
keeps control of the operational level of the national oil industry. 
(iv) The creation of a national fund for the allocation of the expected revenues from the oil 
commercialization. This measure represents a shift from the absence of rule in the allocation of the 
government take, to a creation of a fund for the allocation of oil revenues. This instrument may is 
a measure to mitigate the effects of the Dutch disease. And also to constraint the use of resources 
avoiding resources’ misuse. All the oil revenues of Federal Government will be concentrated in 
the same fund, in order to avoid possible negatives effects in the economy, and to focus their use 
on the eradication of poverty and on economic development (Law_12.351, 2010). 
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 The area concerned is commonly called pre-salt because the oil is located below a sick salt layer and more than 6,4 
kilometers sea level, deep beneath a 4,828 meter layer of salt deposits. It is 350 kilometers away from the coast and is 
surface is around 149 000 km2. 
9
 The 30 billion of barrels is an estimation done by ANP, (ANP, 2011).There are also other estimations much more 
optimist and arrive up to 80 millions of barrels. 
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 These discoveries are the world’s most promising fields since the discoveries in Kazakhstan in 2000.  
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(v) The second dimension of Law 12.351 implies a shift from income allocated to producing states to 
the new sharing rule among the Union, the states and the municipalities. This measure aims to 
increase and stabilize the income of non-producing states (Law_12.351, 2010). 
These five instruments however are not isolated, they interact between them and they may impact in 
the different objectives. In the next sections, we analyse the change in the regulatory framework, 
describing in detail the relationship between the three main objectives that guided the reform and the 
instruments designed to implement them. We divide the next sections by objectives and we highlight 
the different instruments that may impact in each objective positively and negatively. 
2. Increasing the government take 
This section describes the relationship between the first objective of the new regulatory framework 
(increase in the government take) and the instruments designed to achieve it. The new regulatory 
framework impacting the government take in three different ways: (i) changing the regime of resource 
access (from concession to production sharing agreement); (ii) modifying the incentives in the bidding 
process (the minimum participation of Petrobras in every project will impact the players’ incentives 
when bidding in the auctions) and (iii) incentivising cost reduction (controlling cost by PPSA and 
monopsony power of Petrobras). 
2.1 From concession to Production Sharing Agreement regime 
The main formal difference between the ‘concession’ and ‘PSA’ regimes has to do with the ownership 
of the oil (and other hydrocarbons) to be extracted (Nakle, 2008).Under concession agreements, the oil 
company usually retains ownership of any oil that is produced, so that it is free to sell it at the market 
price. In a PSA regime, the ownership of the oil is split between the IOC (Independent Oil Company) 
and the host State (or its national oil company) (Brinsmead, 2011). 
Even if the differences of the two regimes seem just a legal matter (the oil ownership), it has 
consequences in the amount of government take. The differences between the two regimes in the 
government take are related to the risk bearing resulted from the contract. Put it differently, the main 
difference concerns how the fees received by the government include risks: the risk of oil price, the 
risk of volume production and the risks of production costs. In the production sharing agreement the 
government take depends on all the risks associated with the exploration, the production and the 
market price. Under concessions, it will depend only on how the fees paid by the government are 
calculated. 
The risk bearing effect can be observed in the way to allocate production costs. Under the PSA 
regime, the government and oil companies share profits, so that it guarantees that the cost is covered 
before the calculation of the government take
11
. Under the concession regime, there is no guarantee 
that the costs will be covered before the payment of the government take. Moreover, the government 
take does not depend on production costs, the companies have therefore more incentives to decrease 
production costs
12
. 
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 The PSA offers a profit distribution. The extracted oil is first used to pay for the costs of the joint-venture, this is the 
“cost-oil”. The rest of the oil, the “profit-oil”, is divided between the Union and the joint-venture. In the case of Brazil the 
percentage of the profit-oil that goes to the Union will be the result of the bidding to acquire blocks in the Pre-Salt. (This 
situation aims to increase the Brazil percentage in the oil profit if there is enough competition in the bidding process as 
we will discuss further). 
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 The difference of the incentives between concession and PSA can be compared with other regulatory mechanism as the 
“price-cap” and “cost-plus” tariffs. The first (concession and price cap) drive the decrease of production costs can also 
result in under-investment and the consequent problems of safety (or quality). The second (cost-plus and PSA) 
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Besides that the new regulatory framework also changed the nature of the bidding process in the 
auctions (as observed in the table 1). 
Table 1: Brazilian Government Take 
Law 9478 – Concession  Law 12351 – PSA  
• Signature Bonus (defined by auction) 
• Area reservation fee (pre-established) 
• Royalties (pre-established) 
• Special participations (pre-established) 
• Oil profit (Production sharing defined by 
auction) 
• Royalties (pre-established) 
• Signature Bonus (pre-established) 
Source: Own elaboration data from Law_9478 and Law_12351 
As we can observe in the Table 1, there are four types of governmental participation in the Brazilian 
concession regime
13
: 
 The signature bonus which is an up-front payment done in the moment of contract signature. The 
minimum value is determined by the government and the actual value depends on the auction 
result. The higher the bonus signature offered, the higher the possibility to win the auction. 
 The right to reserve and product in the area, paid for by the monopoly right to explore and 
product the resources in determined area. This is an established fee paid per Km, independently 
of the actually production. 
 The royalties are values established before the auction procedure and range between 5 and 10% 
according to evaluation of the risk done by the regulator (ANP). These values are paid by month 
over the production of gas and oil. 
 The special participation, which is an “extra” fee that must be paid depending on the production 
volume (big fields) or on high profitability. In practice as the regulator are not really able to 
calculate the profitability because the information about costs is asymmetric, the application of 
special participation mainly depends on the field size. 
In the second column of the Table 1, we observe that the new regulatory framework does not include 
area reservation fees and special participations. But it includes the oil profit. Moreover, the new 
regulatory framework also changes the fee that is defined by the auction procedure: from the bonus 
signature to the participation in the oil profit. 
The exclusion of the area reservation fee actually means a decrease in the government take not 
associated with any risk (volume, geographical, production). However, as we can see in the Figure 1, 
the weight of this kind of government take in the total amount is close to be irrelevant. 
  
(Contd.)                                                                  
guaranteeing to cover the cost give less incentives to decrease the investment. For more about price-cap and cost-plus 
(Kahn, 1970). 
13
 It is worth to note that these level of government take described here does not include the general taxes applied to the oil 
and gas sectors. 
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Figure 1: The percentage of government take by type (in 2007) 
 
Source: Own elaboration data from ANP and (Regra, 2008)  
The exclusion of the special participation will have a much higher impact. Special participations are 
added to deal with the different levels of productivity of the fields. But under the PSA, it is substituted 
by the profit oil that the government receives. In that view, the oil profit includes the risk of the 
production costs, whereas the special participation is a fixed percentage of the total of the oil 
produced. This change in the regulatory framework thus implies a change in the risk bearing. 
As the participation of the government in the oil profit will be auctioned, it will depend on players’ 
expectation about the productivity of the field. Thus, the government take includes players’ 
perceptions of risk and their behaviours in the auction. In that view, a possible hedge against this risk 
is establishing a minimum value for oil profits (along the lines of a floor hedge).  
Finally, the signature bonus will be kept. The main idea behind this bonus, which is an up-front 
payment, is to avoid players not willing to explore the field to bid in the auction. The only difference 
between regimes in this regard is that under concessions, this value is defined by the auction. In the 
PSA regime, it will be defined by the government body (or by the regulator) before the auction takes 
place. Although the way to establish this value is not defined yet, it should not represent significant 
changes in the government take. 
From the previous analysis we may conclude that the government is affording to take more risk. 
The logic for that is the aim to obtain higher government takes. As consequence of the pre-salt 
geological discoveries, the perceived geological risk has strongly decreased. It has pushed the 
government to take part of the risk (which the companies bear under the concession regime) in order 
to increase the government take
14
. 
2.2 The new role of Petrobras impacting players’ bids  
We can assume that the government take from profit oil will be higher than the concession bonus 
signature. We can expect that the profit oil may substitute the share of the special participation in the 
government take. As consequence, the auction results, under the PSA regime, will have a higher 
impact on the government take than in the concession regime. Therefore, the government has stronger 
interest to have good results in the PSA auctions. 
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 It is worth to note that the government has even makes some exploration fields in order to increase the value of the fields. 
As it was observed in the case of the Libra field first exploration, ANP contracted Petrobras to explore and open the 
information of the fields as it is authorized by Law_2351. 
Michelle Hallack and François Lévêque 
8 
According to the Law 2351, the PSA contract should be auctioned
15
, but there is no further detail 
about the auction process. Nonetheless, it is expected that the auction will allocate the project to the 
consortium accepting the lower oil profits (higher oil profits for the government take)
16
. Hence, 
Petrobras should be part of any consortium winning the auction, under the conditions of the contract 
winning the auction. In the past Petrobras has been the largest player in the auctions, winning alone or 
in consortium around 90% of the auctions (see below)
17
. However, Petrobras is not central only 
because of the weight of its bids, but also because the way others players interpret Petrobras’ bids. The 
new role of Petrobras will thus impact the bids in several ways. 
2.2.1 The auction features 
In order to understand the new role of Petrobras in the auction process, this section gives an overview 
on how the auctions used to be structured in the Brazilian concession regime, and what are the 
expected changes in the PSA regime. 
For each round of auction, an authorization of CNPE is required and the ANP starts the process. 
Thus first there is a decision taken by the CNPE about how much, when and where the blocks will be 
open to bids. This is a political choice as it may have several impacts on development of the regions of 
the country, in the amount of expected government take and so on. After that, the ANP with the 
Agencies’ specialists enters in the second step of decisions. The ANP analyzes seismic data to define 
the blocks and also to define the rules and the actions mechanisms in order to achieve the policy 
objectives in the most efficient ways.  
In the concession regime, the criteria to choose the winner depends 40% on bids in the signature 
bonus, 20% on the local content and 40% on the E&P program
18
. The choice is totally transparent as a 
first-price sealed bid auction occurs for each block. Companies submit their offers in sealed envelopes 
which are opened to everyone so that chances of cheating and corruption are reduced. This system, 
which has been used for more than 10 years, has proven its efficiency and seems to be considered as a 
successful process by both regulators and IOC’s19. 
With the new regime, the auction criteria will change. Indeed, even if the local content and the 
E&P program remain as factors to win the bid, a new factor appears with the PSA model: the oil 
profits (which will substitute the bonus signature in the auction).  
2.2.2 The impact of mandatory participation of Petrobras on the auction results  
Petrobras has been the main player of the Brazilian auctions in the concession regime. Hernandez-
Perez (2011) studied the intensity of auctions competition (represented by the amount of the average 
winning bid), taking into account the participation of Petrobras. The work shows that, out of 311 
offshore blocks offered, Petrobras bid 244 times (alone or in a consortium) and won 220 blocks, which 
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 The other mechanism accepted by the law (2351) is the direct contract with Petrobras.  
16
 These guidelines can be observed in letter attached to law project signed by the diverse ministries one of them the current 
president Dilma Russef, (E.M.I. n 00038 – MME/MF/MDIC/MP/CCIVIL).  
17
 Data from ANP database – auction rounds http://www.anp.gov.br/?id=2652.  
18
 The weight of the different parameters of the auctions changes in the different rounds. The values described here refer to 
the last rounds (since the 7th round). 
19
 We can find some critics about the auctions process, especially regarding the first-price sealed bid (Hernandez-Perez, 
2011). Nevertheless, other propositions that could improve the information assessment could also open room for 
corruption. 
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shows that Petrobras wins more than 90 % of its bids. Moreover, 40% of the blocks are offered to a 
Petrobras ‘consortium bidding alone(Hernandez-Perez, 2011)20.  
Petrobras seems to have a competitive advantage in Brazil auctions because of the geological 
knowledge of Brazilian basins, and because of the technological knowledge to explore and produce 
hydrocarbon in deep-off-shore. Petrobras knowledge comes from its incumbent situation and its 
historical main role in the petroleum industry. The better knowledge of Petrobras seems not be just 
geological information, as all players have access to it, but that knowledge is related to intangible 
assets which is mainly kept by their workers. How this knowledge actually differentiates Petrobras of 
the other companies is hard to know. However, one may observe that Petrobras impacts players’ 
behavior in the auctions. Most of the companies (especially when entering in the market) prefer to be 
part of a consortium with Petrobras. This effect decrease actual competition. This lack of competition 
is conspicuous if we compare the average winning bid of blocks where Petrobras is involved and the 
others bids without Petrobras participation. (Hernandez-Perez, 2011) showed that the participation of 
Petrobras in the bids decrease the number of bidders. 
The new oil regime may totally change this phenomenon. Indeed, as Petrobras will be involved in 
the winning consortium with at least 30% of the shares and will be the sole operator in the blocks 
under the PSA regime, the great advantage of being Petrobras ally will decrease. Every consortium 
winning the bid will be able (and obliged) to be associated with Petrobras, and thus the Petrobras 
know-how will not be an entry barrier.  
In addition, it is possible that the new regulatory regime ends up with a lower Petrobras 
participation in the auctions. As Petrobras have the obligation to participate (minimum of 30%) and to 
operate each block, the allocation of its resources should give priority to its obligations. Thus, in the 
scenario of resource scarcity, Petrobras should decrease its bids. The absence of Petrobras in the bids 
should increase competition and it might lead to increase of government take. 
Another consequence of the role of Petrobras as unique operator is the increase of its market power 
position. Petrobras will become a monopsony (or a quasi-monopsony) for many products and 
technologies related to the Pre-salt exploration and production. This market position of Petrobras may 
drive input prices down. And it may decrease cost and increase profits. A consequence of the increase 
of profit oil is the increase of the government take.  
Nevertheless, the new regime also may have negative impacts on competition. The PSA regime is 
new, and thus it may be perceived by companies as regulatory instability (at least in the beginning). 
They may be concerned with the possibilities of hold-up owing to the higher interference of public 
enterprises (PPSA and Petrobras). However, these perception and subsequent disincentives seem to us 
not likely to be significant. In comparison with other countries, Brazil is much less risky for IOCs and 
they will be eager to participate in the Pre-Salt adventure. 
2.3 New mechanism for controlling costs: the creation of PPSA 
The PSA regime introduces the obligation to share oil profits with the government. This decreases 
players’ incentives to keep lower production costs, as the profits are not earned only by them but it 
should be shared with the government. The choices in the exploration and production can represent 
huge amount of resources and also different technological choices. To control the situation, the 
presence of the PPSA in the consortium with veto power aims to allow the government to oversee the 
consortium’s decisions. 
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 These results of Hernandez-Perez (2011) study only concern offshore blocks, which is the main capability of Petrobras, 
as underlined by most of the analysts interviewed (Hernandez-Perez, 2011). 
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The PPSA aims to protect the rights of the State in the consortium, as well as to manage all the 
issues related to the PPSA contract (Law_12.304, 2010). PPSA will monitor the projects and the 
investment decisions. It may have several benefits, as to prevent Petrobras not to take into account the 
efficient propositions of the other companies in the consortium. Also, it will be a source for data for 
the government and thus decreasing the information asymmetry, which is a frequent issue in the 
calculation of the government take (Pires, 2011). 
The role of the (future) PPSA will be, in our view, crucial not just because of their benefits, but 
also because of its potential drawbacks. In the case that the government behave opportunistically by 
using the PPSA power inside the consortium, it may result in hold-up problems and all the associated 
long-term negatives consequences. According to how the contract will be delimited and how PPSA 
will behave, we may consider three possible scenarios: 
i) In the first scenario, PPSA power is not delimited by contract, i.e., consortium contract does not 
frame the timing of exploration/production and does not delimit the PPSA power on deciding the 
investment decision. In this context PPSA may decide to exercise its power to increase the 
government take in the short run. It will probably result in hold-up of private companies’ profits. 
As Petrobras owns at least 30% of the consortium’s share, PPSA and Petrobras will stand for 65% 
of the shares in the operation committee. The collusion of Petrobras and PPSA would win any 
decision in the operational committee. The other IOC’s will be in minority and won’t be able to 
control their investment. For instance, PPSA and Petrobras could decide to slow down production 
on a block in order to focus on other more strategic or profitable area. For a company involved in 
only one of these blocks, it may be very risky to invest without being sure that the exploration and 
exploitation will be made at a reasonable pace. 
ii) In the second scenario, PPSA power is not delimited by contract but it decides not to collude with 
Petrobras, focusing on less costly exploration and production and the profit maximization of the 
field. It will likely generate credibility and it will likely not generate any negative effect in the 
long term.  
iii) In the third scenario, the PPSA power is delimited by a contract, which, for instance, may 
establish the exploration and production timing. Nowadays in the concession regime there are a 
scheduling about periods of exploration/ commercialization declaration and production. Some 
scheduling frame could be included in the PPSA contracts. It would allow the IOCs to have a 
better forecast about the investment recover. Other clauses regarding the investment decision and 
technological choices could also be added. This kind of clause, decreasing the discretionary power 
of the ‘ex-post’21 consortium’s decision, would be a safeguard for the IOCs. It would decrease any 
potential negative effect of the PPSA in the long and short term. 
Therefore, the creation of the PPSA is a sensible answer to control costs and to disclose information in 
the context of PSA agreement. Nevertheless, because of its power, any deviation in the PPSA behavior 
from the ideal behavior may represent an important loss of credibility of the regime from the private 
companies’ viewpoint. Private companies’ expectation on the profitability is central to assure high 
government takes, as it strongly impacts on the auctions results. 
2.4 Assessment 
The PSA regime can be thought of as seeking higher profits for the government, through assuming a 
more risky position with respect to production costs. Moreover two additional instruments can be 
thought of in the same terms: the new role of Petrobras (as unique operator and the minimum 
participation in every project with at least 30%) and the creation of the PPSA. 
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The risk of the Pre-salt fields seems much lower (according to many specialists) because of the 
geological characteristics of the region. However, the assessment of the new risk position implied in 
the new regulatory framework is extremely difficult to assess and beyond the scope of this paper. The 
implementation of such risk position has important consequences in the bidding process. Another risk 
that may be evaluated is the players’ perception of the regulatory risk. If the government enters into a 
PSA but the auction results are worse, the situation may result in a decrease of the government take. 
The role of Petrobras mandatory participation in every project may have two positive impacts in 
the government take: the increase of the auction competitiveness and the decrease of input costs. And 
both, more competitive auctions and higher profit oil results in larger government takes. 
To control the increasing power of Petrobras in this new context the government create the PPSA 
to oversee the cost and guarantee the higher oil profit. The participation of PPSA in the project 
decisions as well as its veto power, however, can be misused. If misused the PPSA power could 
generate important losses to the associated companies and it would strongly affect the credibility of 
the new regime. We can conclude that the PPSA control might be an effective measure, in case PPSA 
does not misuse its power. 
In a nutshell, it is very likely that the new regime will result in an increase in the government take. 
3. Developing the national oil industry 
The second main objective of the new regulatory framework is to push the development of national 
gas and oil industry. The national development of the industry means the internalization of the 
production chain and specially the internalization of the innovation process. There is a significant 
economic literature discussing the pros and cons of industrial policy. 
One may think of a variety of market failures that explain the economic logic behind industrial 
policies: for instance, the innovation spill-overs (positive externalities). 
There is an increasing recognition that “developing societies need to embed private initiative in a 
framework of public action that encourages restructuring, diversification, and technological 
dynamism beyond what market forces on their own would generate” (Rodrick, 2004, page 1). 
The industrial policies complement market forces: they reinforce or counteract the allocative effects 
that the existing markets would otherwise produce
22
. In the Brazilian industry, the main idea behind 
the industrial policy is the development of the national outsourcing in the different levels of the 
industry chain. In other words, the objective is not just to generate rent by producing and exporting 
fuel, but also by producing the entire chain within the country. And special attention paid to 
innovation, because of the expected externality effects that it may generate (Heum et al., 2011). 
There is also relevant literature examining the local content experiences in different oil and gas 
industries. Nordås et al. (2003) analysed six different countries (Norway, Nigeria, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Brazil and Mexico) and compared their success to the development of the oil and gas 
industries by using their local content policies. The Norway experience has been recognized as an 
example of success. Nigeria’s policies have not obtained positive results. The rest of the experiences 
may be placed between these two extremes. The Norway firms have developed industrial capacity that 
now serves the oil and gas industries all around the world. In contrast to the other countries, Nigeria 
was not able to develop a manufacturing sector, which seems to be a prerequisite to succeed. Indonesia 
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 In Latin America the discussion about Industrial Policy may remote to the discussion of CEPAL in the 1960’s, which one 
of the main authors is Raul Prebish (Prebisch, 1959). Since that it has strongly transformed and passed by different 
economic theoretical backgrounds, but in some somehow it always has been presented in the Latin America economic 
policies. The main arguments can be seen in (ECLAC, 1995) and (Kosacoff et al., 1999). 
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and Malaysia have achieved in some extent the expansion of domestic manufacturing where oil and 
gas activities have taken place (Nordås et al., 2003). 
Brazil and Mexico are countries with strong national oil companies (respectively, Petrobras and 
Pemex). They both have policies focused on local contents. But the investment in national chains has 
been mainly pushed by their national oil companies. The strategy adopted by these countries seems 
more effective than the cases of Nigeria, Malasia and Indonesia, but they are not as successful as 
Norway (Heum, et al., 2011). 
Next we analyse the new regulatory framework from the viewpoint of the implementation of 
industrial policy. 
3.1 Challenges of using local content clauses 
In the concession regime, the mechanism developed to use the petroleum exploration and production 
to develop the Brazilian industry is the clause of local content. Actually, it is one of the elements 
auctioned in the rounds. In principle, it is possible to conclude it worked, because of the high local 
content in the auctions bids. Nevertheless, we observe changes in the local content rules, resulting in a 
situation where the local content bids are not really competitive. Moreover, we observe that the ANP 
capacity to actually enforce the clauses is uncertain. We will analyse below these effects. 
3.1.1 The definition of local content 
Local development requires the use of domestic resources, especially domestic labour and skills. This 
does not need to be necessarily associated with a national company, but it can be a company with 
foreign ownership installed within national borders. The objective is to encourage the aggregation of 
value in the production chain within national borders (by employing local staff, local materials, local 
services and facilities). This means that local content policies should encourage foreign firms to 
collaborate with local companies. Such collaboration is expected to generate dynamics that will have 
positive impacts on the development of indigenous firms, (Nordås, et al., 2003). 
In Brazil, the definition of local contents is done by the regulator (ANP) and has changed between 
the first and seventh rounds. In the beginning, the local content product was defined as any product by 
a company which was legally installed in Brazil, independently of the products components. There 
were several adaptations and since the 7
th
 round the local content is defined by the national percentage 
of each component and service. It has been an evolution that defined better the local component 
according the actual aggregate value by national products and services. On other hand, it has included 
a hardly complicated and sophisticated mechanism which increases administrative costs (Rocha, 
2010). 
Besides that the Brazilian regulator ANP is the responsible to enforce the contracts. They emit 
Local Content Certification for the divers companies and products through the industry chain. And, 
they oversee companies’ compliance with their obligations in the signed contracts. In case the oil 
companies do not comply with the local content established by contract, they get penalized. 
This mechanism generated two key economic problems: how to define the value of local content 
that is economically efficient; and how to define a penalty strong enough to enforce the contract but 
not too strong to become an entry barrier. The level of local content cannot be too high, in otherwise, it 
might avoid some efficient companies to enter in the market if they are able to cope with the ‘too’ high 
level of local content. It is true for the companies along the whole chain of production, from the ICO’s 
to the provider of tools and software. We observe that this is still a challenge for the concession 
regime to promote local content. 
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3.1.2 The observed results of local content in Brazilian bids 
In order to identify the information about the willingness (and expected costs) of the enterprises to use 
local contents, the volume of the local content was introduced in the auctions. As we can observe in 
the figure 2, the companies had offered a percentage for exploration phase (blue in figure 2) and 
another for the development phase (red in figure 2).We can separate the bids in local contents in three 
phases according to the rounds’ rules: phase 1, including the four initial rounds (between 1999 and 
2002), phase 2 including the fifth and sixth rounds ( between 2003 and 2004) and phase 3 including 
the seventh, ninth and tenth rounds (between 2005 and 2008). 
Figure 2: Local content average result in the auctions rounds
23
 
 
Source: Own elaboration data from ANP 
In the first phase there was no requirement of minimum local content rate and the maximum rate for 
punctuation effect was 70%. The weight of the local content in the note offer for block was 15%. In 
this phase we can observe a low average of local content bids. 
In the second phase it was established the minimum amount of local content
24
 and the weight of 
local content in the bid increased to 40%. We observe an important increase in the local content bids 
and some bids reached 100% of local content. It was observed the tendency of some players to overbid 
the local contents to win the concession auction without take into account the actual feasibility and 
cost that it would represent. 
In the third phase beyond the requirement of global minimum percentages was transferred to limit 
the offers to the maximum values. Moreover the bids were also separated in sub-sections inside 
exploration, development and production
25
. For these rounds the weight of the Local Content was 
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 The 8th round legal proceeding was suspended; it is why it is not included in our figures. Moreover, it is worth to note 
that the 10th round just include on-shore fields, which often demands a lower level of exploration/ development 
technologies. 
24
 The minimum of local contend differentiated for blocks located in lands, blocks located in flat waters and for blocks 
located in deep waters. 
25
 “In these rounds was transferred to consider the localization of the blocks according to 4 criterias: in land, flat waters 
with blade up to 100 meters, flat waters with blade between 100 and 400 meters and deep waters with blade above of 400 
meters. A relation having itens and subitens so for the exploration as for the development it was in a spread sheet, with a 
minimum percentage for each one of these itens and subitens, only the company offered values of local content and 
attributed weights for each one of them. 
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20%. Most of the local contents bids were the maximum rate allowed in the auction, (TCU, 2010)
26
. 
We saw a decrease of the rates in the round 7 and 9. The round ten included just onshore fields, and 
thus, the local content maximum rates and bided rates tended to be higher. 
The difficult to bid a coherent value of local content in the auctions can be understood by the 
uncertainty that players have in the moment of the auction. The exploration phase is defined between 3 
and 8 years and the production phase up to 27 years (Rocha, 2010). How much local content they will 
be able to include is quite uncertain. Consequently, the behaviour of the companies’ bids does not 
seem able to reflect the costs of the local content policy. 
The figure 3 represents the participation of the local contents on the bids competition. The blue 
bars show the percentage of bids that there were any bid competition (on local content or bonus or 
investment scheduling). The red bars show the percentage of bids which had any competition on local 
content rate. In the first round every competitor in the bid had a different local content rate. In the 
second, third and fourth rounds the local content differences decreased. In the fifth round there were 
small competition in the bids and it included all variables (including the local contents). It is worth to 
remember that in this round the local content rate become more important in the auctions’ results 
(from 15% to 40%). In the sixth round the importance of local content competition comparing with the 
total competitive bids was lower as many of the competing bids bided the highest local content value. 
In the last three rounds the local content value also had a reduced importance, it can explained by the 
tendency to the players to bid the local content rate as maximum of established by the auction rule 
(AlonsoTrigo, 2010). 
Figure 3: Local content divergence in the bids
27
 
 
Source: Own elaboration data from ANP 
(Contd.)                                                                  
 The punctuation of global local content in such a way for exploration as for the development was a result from the sum of 
the multiplication of the offers of percentages of local content for itens and subitens for the respective weights. Another 
new from the rounds was the introduction of the "Cartilha de Conteúdo Local" as a tool of measurement of contractual 
local content”, (ANP, 2009). 
26
 In 2005 as established the local content certificated program and harder criterions. Moreover in 2007, it was deliberated 
by that ANP should make transparent the criterions of determination of minimum and maximum level of local content 
allowed in the bids (Acórdão 2.249/2007). 
27
 The 8th round legal proceeding was suspended; it is why it is not included in our figures. 
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Further studies on the players strategy on this bids are necessary and it seems that players had a learn 
curve about how to bid on local content variable. In addition, they needed to adapt according to the 
changes in the rules of local content bids (as changes on the rate floor/ceiling and on the weight in the 
bids results). However, after the data analysis and the interviews, it seems that the strategies of the 
enterprises were to put the maximum amount of the local content. Even if the capacity of the 
enterprises to actually follow the amount of local content proposed in the bid seemed limited 
afterwards
28
. 
3.1.3 The enforcement of local content: the role of ANP 
A gap between the contracts and the actual local content percentage has appeared. The ANP role 
enforcing the contracts is taking places. Between 2008 and 2010, ANP overseen was focused on the 
contracts established in the first four rounds. In these contracts no penalties were necessary. The 
companies were able to follow the contract first because the amount of local content bid in the first 
rounds were lower and second because the definition of the local content in the first rounds were less 
restrictive. In 2011, ANP supervised the local content contracted in the 5
th
 and 6
th
 round and found 
many irregularities. Until now, around 70 contracts out of 255
29
 do not comply adequately with their 
local content clauses; five operators may have some penalties and four operators were penalized 
(Macedo, 2012). 
The local content clauses as mechanism to drive industrial policy cannot be fully evaluated by now. 
As we explained before, the investment cycles in the petroleum industry is of too long and there is too 
much uncertainty about technology and resources availability in the moment of the blocks’ bids. In 
this regard, however, we are able to underline some challenges of this mechanism: the first concerns 
the definition of local content; the second one deals with the definition of the amount of local content 
at the signature of the contract because of the high uncertainty; the third challenge is the difficulty of 
enforcement. 
The problems of enforcement can be seen first regarding the ANP cost to measure and to oversee; 
and second the judiciary costs, as the companies tend to use all legal rooms to avoid or reduce their 
penalties. 
Moreover, if the amount of contract which is not followed by the companies keeps increasing, it 
could indicate that the enterprises prefer to pay penalties than invest in the local content. It can be seen 
as central failure of this kind of policy, as the objective is not to receive penalties but have the oil and 
gas industries developed. Seen all these challenges another mechanism will be adopted under the PSA 
regime. 
3.2 The role of “public” enterprises 
Under the concession regime, the ANP has two main roles in the application of local content policy an 
‘ex-ante’ role (defining the rounds) and an “ex-post” role (penalizing the companies which do not 
follow the contracts). The ANP roles were the only government instrument to apply local content 
policy. There was no ‘policy’ intervention through the process of exploring and producing the oil 
fields. 
In the PSA regime, the use of Petrobras as only operator aim to promote the industrial policy 
through the time. Moreover the PPSA will be able also to oversee the decision through the decision 
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 In the interviews it was underlined that some players actually had bid in order to win without actually take in 
consideration the cost of the local content, instead they may just take into account the penalty or the expectation to 
renegotiate the clause. 
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 Number of blocks auctioned in the 5th and 6th rounds. 
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process. These two mechanisms will allow the intervention by increasing local content or by enforcing 
local content contracts over the exploration and production period. This mechanism strongly relies on 
Petrobras and brings many advantages and challenges for the enterprise. And in order to offset 
Petrobras power, the overseeing role of PPSA can be quite important to keep the policy in the track. 
3.2.1 The key role of Petrobras 
Under the new PSA regime, Petrobras will be assigned to operate all the pre-salt blocks which will be 
allocated. It aims to develop the indigenous oil industry through Petrobras. It means the development 
within the company and also the collaboration with other national enterprises and national research 
center. Petrobras on one hand must give priority to indigenous outsourcing as much as possible; 
however, it needs to take into account the constraints and the costs.  
Petrobras has 56 years of experience in the Brazilian oil industry; it was responsible for the 
discovery of the oil in Brazil's Pre-Salt layer. It is the biggest deep water operator in the world and has 
the largest floating production system fleet. Petrobras is known for having knowledge about 
researching and mining the Brazilian sedimentary basins, a fruit of the investments it has made in 
upwards of five decades. As the sole operator, Petrobras will be able to apply all of this experience in 
exploring and producing oil and gas in the Brazilian Pre-Salt. 
Besides the technical qualification of Petrobras, the choice for having Petrobras as the sole operator 
is also a consequence of its nationality and more important the participation of the government in the 
company’s ownership. Petrobras is a semi-public corporation, with both private and public capital, 
however as mentioned before the government has majority in the decisions rights. The dubious 
character of Petrobras (public and private) is quite complex mechanism. Thus sometime it allows the 
use of the company to drive governmental policies, as consequence of the Union control of the 
company, and in other moment it acts as private enterprise looking for profit, as the expected behavior 
from a company quoted in the international stock market (Alveal, 2001). 
Under the concession regime Petrobras has already demonstrated its potential to drive the oil and 
gas industry in Brazil. Petrobras has shown in the last years, in average, a much higher level of local 
content than what was demanded by the contracts (Negri et al., 2010). The supply chain of goods and 
services to the oil industry is highly intensive in scale and technology. Externalities from the 
economies of scale and technological efforts of firms can be observed. Negri et al. (2010) showed that 
the firms that signed contract with Petrobras created more jobs and exports more than the other firms 
of the same sector
30
. The study shows the impact of the Petrobras in the different industries in Brazil. 
Then, it is in order to guarantee and increase the impact of Petrobras in the Brazilian industry that the 
company has been chose and the unique operator (Negri et al., 2010). 
In the new regulatory framework Petrobras have special rights and duties. If on one hand it means 
the monopoly to operate all the non-allocated pre-salt fields, on the other hand it also means the 
obligation to explore and produce in each field auctioned. The relation between government interest 
and Petrobras interest should be equilibrated. 
The expected impact of the unique operator clause in the company 
The unique operator situation of Petrobras actually means a legal entry barrier and an actual monopoly 
situation. On the other hand, it means the obligation to invest in every project which may encounter 
limits in the restriction of financial and human resources. 
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 The sectors where the is greater impact are: chemicals, rubber, metallurgy, machinery and equipment, electrical 
machinery, electronic equipment and instrumentation 
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From the Petrobras perspective, the monopoly situation may help her to keep the Brazilian pre-salt 
knowledge. In other words, it protects the Petrobras know-how, keeping her technical competitiveness 
in the deep offshore E&P (especially in Brazil). 
Second, it may have a global positive effect as it may accelerate the learning curve of Petrobras 
because of the amount of new fields that need to be explored. Moreover the Petrobras will be able to 
profit of the scale economies, driving knowledge and research and as well as for increase logistic 
efficiency. 
31
Another advantage for Petrobras is the increasing efficiency in the coordination between 
the blocks. The knowledge and participation in every block will allow Petrobras to coordinate better 
the production in different blocks (BCG, 2011). 
Third positive effect for Petrobras as it will become a monopsony (or quasi-monopsony) for most 
of the input associated with the Pre-salt fields’ exploration and production. And we can expected that 
it could drive input prices down. 
On the other hand, the first negative effect of the new Petrbras’ position seems to be the pressure 
over the Petrobras human and well as financial resources. Petrobras will need enormous amount of 
investment and qualified human resource to be able to operate all the pre-salt fields, (Petrobras, 2011). 
We can have some figures about the amount of work force that Petrobras is expecting to contract in 
the figure 4. However, even if is expected to have massive contraction to increase the Petrobras’ 
workforce, the big issue here is the qualification (and the time necessary to qualify) of the new 
employees. 
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 A study conducted by BCG – which involved 500 Petrobras employees – showed that “experience curves” yield to major 
Capex savings for Petrobras and its suppliers. For Petrobras, “the magnitude and duration of the pre-salt development 
campaign would strongly drive experience-effects gains via continued optimization efforts”. Such experience effects will 
be all the more so effective because Petrobras will be the only operator on the pre-salt and because it will be able to 
manage and concentrate its efforts. Indeed, the results of the model established by BCG are promising: “Based on the 
estimation of consolidated experience curves, the potential for investment reduction in wells and subsea systems across 
the pre-salt campaign could be calculated. In present value, these investment reductions added up to 11% for well drilling 
and completion and 10% for subsea systems. Combined, these savings amounted to about 8% of the total forecast 
investment for the pre-salt campaign (BCG, 2011).  
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Figure 4: Petrobras workforce 
 
The issue of human resources is still harder because in the last decades (before 2004) the Petrobas 
spent long period without contracting (around 10 years) it provoked a gap of high qualified experts in 
Petrobras. The mechanism utilized to fulfill the gap of qualification is a strong investment in the 
education and qualification of Petrobras employees. However, as part of the knowledge is mainly 
acquired by the experience, it may be a challenge for Petrobras, especially in the moment of high need 
of qualified human resources. 
The high amount of investment needed is also a key issue
32
. Investment needs are associated with 
financial resources and the risks associated. The market risk associated to the financial resources 
necessary to allow the amount of investment necessary may weaken Petrobras. To support the costs of 
future operations, Petrobras has aggressively pursued an open capital strategy domestically and 
abroad
33
. Moreover, it also borrows money from the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico 
e Social (BNDES), and makes a financial contract with the Chinese oil firm Sinopec and Bank of 
Development of China (BDC) with the commitment of oil exports
34
. However, the technical and 
financial challenges associated with the development of Brazil’s new oil finds would need to raise 
further funds to cover the future investments. In a world where credit is crunched, others wonder 
whether Petrobras will be able to have enough financing funds. Up to know, however, it was not seen 
any lack of funding to Petrobras investment. 
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 The Petrobras’ expected investment between 2011 and 2015 is US$ 224.7billion from which 87% is in E&P (Petrobras, 
2011). 
33
 On September 24, 2010 Petrobras initiated a public offering in New York and São Paulo worth US$70 billion. Two-third 
of the new value was acquired by the government. 
34
 In May 2009, Petrobras signed agreements with the Bank of Development of China (BDC) and Sinopec, through which 
obtained loan of U.S. $ 10 billion and is committed to providing 150 thousand barrels of oil per day to China (Sinopec) in 
2009 and 200 thousand barrels per day, between 2010 and 2019 (Itamaraty, 2011). It is worth to note that China become 
the highest importer of Brazilian petroleum in 2010 (ANP database).  
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Second, the obligation of join every block (with a minimum sharing of 30%) according to the 
contract signed in the auction may lead a situation of non-profitability for Petrobras. The consortium 
of firms may win the PSA auction with a too lower participation of the profit oil. If not obliged 
Petrobras could choose not take part, though, under the new law it is obliged to participate.  
The third drawback for Petrobras (and also for the global welfare) is the decrease of companies’ 
diversity. The decrease of diversity of the companies making research to solve the Pre-salt challenges 
may decrease the potential and the efficiency of innovation (FGV/IBRE, 2010). Maximizing the 
reservoirs’ recovery and increasing efficiency of the E&P process will require new cutting-edge 
technology. Theoretical works have pointed out the importance of diversity and competition to drive 
innovation.
35
 Moreover, the study of FVG (2010) showed the potential negative impact in the 
necessary innovation of having a unique operator for such huge area (FGV/IBRE, 2010). This 
drawback may be minimized as consequence of the existent IOC’s already operating in the pre-salt 
area in Brazil. Another source of technology diversification can arise from the different operators that 
may explore and produce oil in equivalent pre-salt fields in other countries (as in the African cost or in 
the Guyana). 
The alignment of capability and the exploration rhythm 
The new petroleum law raises another important issue: as Petrobras is the sole operator in the Pré-Sal, 
the ways blocks are designed should change? Indeed, as Petrobras is already committed in several 
blocks (in 2011, Petrobras produced 2.1 million barrels per day in Brazil and 141 million barrels per 
day abroad), and the company means to operate may be limited (especially in the short term). 
We could imagine two scenarios. In the first one, ANP and CNPE could only focus on Brazil 
interests. In this case, we could imagine that the optimum pace for Brazil could be higher than the 
optimum one for Petrobras. Thus, in order to increase the speed of exploitation of the area, they could 
give several blocks to be auctioned. In this scenario, as Petrobras is compelled to operate every 
attributed block, Petrobras will have to follow a quick pace and may have to abandon some of its 
positions abroad to operate in the Pre-Salt. However, Petrobras is so important for Brazilian economy 
that weakening the company could be quite a dangerous behavior for the Brazilian government. 
That’s why we could imagine a second scenario. In this second scenario, ANP and CNPE would 
work for the Brazil interests but reminding that compelling Petrobras to work fast could be too costly 
and inefficient. Therefore, we could imagine communication and mutual agreement between Petrobras 
and CNPE to adapt the pace. ANP and CNPE would then offer few blocks to be auctioned, giving 
Petrobras the ability to operate at a reasonable pace. 
3.2.2 The overseen role of PPSA 
The presence of Petrobras to nationalize the supply chain will be fundamental; however, because of 
double character of Petrobras (public and private) PPSA will have an overseeing role. PPSA aims to 
guarantee the interest of the Union. As well as looking for lower costs (to increase government take), 
the PPSA will need to look for decisions complying with the interest to national industry policy.  
The PPSA will have a say in the equilibrium between the costs and the advantages associated with 
local content policies. They will probably work close to the CNPE being able inform the expected cost 
and benefits of the choices. 
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innovation see (Gilbert, 2006).  
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3.3 Assessment 
The Brazilian industrial policy aims to promote the internalization of the oil and gas production chain, 
and hence to increase the aggregate value for the whole economy. It also aims at the stimulation of 
spill-over effects among industries. The spill-over effects are markedly related to the broader impacts 
that the efforts to innovate may generate. 
The local content clauses give incentives to all operators to internalize and to innovate in Brazil. 
However until now the capacity of the local content clauses to actually promote the indigenous 
industry development cannot be full evaluate as well as the mechanism to define what is the efficient 
amount of local content. As we described before the rules of local content bids in Brazil’s auctions had 
faced challenges to reveal players information and had changed many times. 
In the PSA the government will promote the role of Petrobras as the main driver of oil and gas 
industrial policy. It can be explained by the observed role that the company has already played under 
concession regime. First, Petrobras has made the effort to have most of employees in the company 
citizens of Brazil. This implied a significant internalization of the chain if compared to other 
companies. Second, Petrobras has given priority to contracting enterprises with high local content, 
especially long-term contracts. This allowed the development of private national companies. And 
third, Petrobras has invested heavily in Brazilian research programs with strong cooperation with the 
Universities. 
It is not clear whether the local content clauses will remain as a bid criterion in the PSA regime. 
However, it is clear that the position of Petrobras as unique operator makes the company the main 
responsible to drive the development of the Brazilian oil and gas industry. This should be done by 
increasing Petrobras itself (being a company with high local content, especially with high participation 
of Brazilian labour) and also by contracts with other companies and research laboratories with high 
Brazilian content. 
Regarding the impact of the regime on Petrobras, we expect it will be positive. Even if we take into 
account the pressure that is concentrated on Petrobras, the position as unique operator and the 
consequent compulsory 30% participation will be mainly positive to the company. 
We showed that the negative effects related to the resources constraints can be mitigated by 
adjusting the rhythm of government choices and the potential of Petrobras. The challenges that can be 
generated by the absence of innovation diversity may be mitigated, first by the current allocation of 
pre-salt fields (done under concession regime and which are operated by different companies), second 
by pre-salt technology developed by companies operating pre-salt regions in other countries, e.g. in 
the African coast. It may be enough to keep diversity on the innovation process. 
The Petrobras operation monopoly may balance the pressure in the costs caused by the local content 
policy. First, costs decrease may occur as consequence of the scale and scope economies. Second, as 
consequence of the Petrobras market power as input buyer, it may push down the input prices. 
In a nutshell, the objective to develop the national industry thanks to the new regime is very likely 
to be achieved. 
4. Mitigating the oil curse 
Empirical evidence showed that the exploitation of natural resources may not be a driver to promote 
countries development, and even the contrary natural resources richness may be a “a curse”. A number 
of studies have shown correlation between low economic growth and the exportation ratio of natural 
The new Brazilian oil regulation: an ex ante economic assessment 
21 
resources
36
. This phenomenon raised the interest of economists, why the natural resources richness 
rarely means countries prosperity? There is no conclusive work pointing out the causes of the “natural 
resources curse”. For the sake of this analysis we will divide the causes of natural resources curse in 
two different issues: first macroeconomic effects that may displace some economic activities because 
of the exchange rate (often called Dutch disease). The second regards the microeconomic economic 
effects that displace economic activities by rent seeking behaviour
37
. Besides the monetary effects of 
the oil rent in a country, in a region with high oil rent can be become more profitable to work for 
receiving part of this rent than in others activities. For instances it may drive the development of 
services and commerce to attend the agents receiving part of the oil rent (public or/and private). 
Moreover, in case of corruption the oil rent spills can be especially dangerous as it deviates the human 
resources from other productive sectors. 
Two modifications in the new regime may avoid the oil curse in Brazil, first is the development of 
social fund which aims to avoid the Dutch disease dangers. The second is the redistribution of 
government take among the diverse government levels (municipalities, state and Union). The new 
arrangement should decrease the risks of the rent seeking hazards. 
4.1 The Social Fund: avoiding Dutch disease 
The so-called Dutch disease refers to the fears of deindustrialization that gripped the Netherlands as a 
result of the appreciation of the Dutch currency after the discovery of natural gas deposits within the 
country’s in the 1960s (Gylfason, 2001a). 
In other words, “The Dutch disease is a major market failure originated in the existence of cheap 
and abundant natural or human resources that keep overvalued the currency of a country for an 
undetermined period of time, thus turning non profitable the production of tradable goods using 
technology in the state-of-the-art” (Bresser-Pereira, 2008, page 1). 
The shift away from manufacturing can be detrimental: resources (capital and labor) would shift into 
the production of domestic non-tradable goods to meet the increase in domestic demand and into the 
booming oil sector. Both of these transfers would shrink production in the now lagging traditional 
export sector. This is known as the ‘resource movement effect’. 
Moreover, the prices of natural resources are quite volatile. That results in a fluctuation in the 
exchange rates and consequently in the exports and imports. Unstable exchange rates create 
uncertainty that damages the trade and the investment. Thus, there is an especial damage for the 
industries with higher need of investment. Because of the long term nature of investments, the 
uncertainty tends to be harder in the long term. As the activities with higher aggregate value need 
higher investment (in physical or human capital), the Dutch disease can lead an economy to a less 
efficient system (Cagnin et al., 2008). 
Largely inspired by the Norwegian model, the Social Fund
38
 - Fundo Social do Pre Sal - has been 
created in December 2010 to manage the oil revenues of the Union (Law_12.351, 2010). The Social 
Fund could be a solution to mitigate the Dutch disease by absorbing the excess liquidity while 
fulfilling social achievement, improving Brazilian’s standard of living and facing the current 
infrastructure bottlenecks.  
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 For studies on natural resources curses empirical studies see for instance (SACHS et al., 1995), (SACHS et al., 1997), 
(Auty, 1993) and (Gylfason, 2001b). 
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 This analysis follows the separation of (Gylfason, 2001b).  
38
 Brazilian fund have similarities with the Norwegian fund, seen their hybrid characteristic (saving, stabilization and 
sovereign wealth), (Fasano, 2000). Nevertheless, it is worth to note that fund expenses would be quite different. While in 
Norway the fund is dedicated to the pension in Brazil it will be dedicated to reduce many of the social gaps of the 
country. 
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We can divide the government funds in at least three different kinds: the stabilization funds (aiming 
to insulate the budget and economy from volatile commodity prices), the saving funds (aiming to 
make inter-generation compensation) and the sovereign wealth funds (aiming to diversify the reserves 
portfolios to have an higher return rate) (Cagnin, et al., 2008). The Brazilian Social Fund aims to be a 
hybrid fund, at the same time a stabilization, saving and sovereign fund. 
The oil fund aims firstly to be an inter-generation compensation. As we can observe in the figure 5, 
it would represent increasing revenue in time and keeping the capital saved allowing inter-generation 
compensation. As the capital would not be utilized, independently of the actual production and 
petroleum rent the volume of revenue would be stable (Cagnin, et al., 2008). It would also avoid the 
problems associated with the volatility of resources revenue, allowing for instance long term 
investment (as it is the case of education and healthy sectors). 
Figure 5: Social Fund Simulation 
 
Source: (Frischtak et al., 2008) 
Moreover, in order to avoid Dutch disease effects the Social Fund needs also to act as a stabilization 
fund. First, it means that at least part of the fund should be invested abroad in order to avoid the over-
valorization of the exchange rate. If the social fund makes all the investment in Brazilian currency, it 
would not be able to avoid the Dutch disease impacts. And in order to have higher return, the social 
fund should be invested in a diversified portfolio that maximizes returns which will be expended for 
social purposes. In this way we can say that the Social Fund also will act like a sovereign wealth 
funds. 
It is worth to note that this fund has also some drawbacks, first the save fund needs to postpone 
consumption. In an undeveloped country where the population has several basic needs, the 
consumption postponement is not always an ‘acceptable’ solution. Moreover, the character of 
stabilization fund (keep at least part of the money in a foreign exchange rate) has a financial cost. As 
Brazilian interest rate are historically much higher than the international interest rate, the stabilization 
fund has a significant opportunity cost that need to be considered. 
4.2 Sharing the resources among municipalities, state and Union 
On the other hand, the “oil curse” could affect Brazil increasing the rent seeking activities and also by 
increasing the corruption problems
39
. Moreover, experience from the past in Brazil and elsewhere 
shows that oil windfalls may decrease the incentive of efficient investments decision. In Brazil, being 
a federation, the states and the municipalities also receive part of the government take. However, the 
control of the use of the oil revenue in the state and municipal level is much unclear. Studies showed 
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that there is strong misallocation of revenue at the municipality levels and with quite different 
implication for the cities’ wealth (Enriquez, 2007)40.  
4.2.1 Importance of the oil revenue in Brazilian economy 
To understand how important the oil revenues could be in the next generation, we can try to simulate 
the share of oil revenues in the Brazilian GDP in 2035, when Brazilian production will probably 
achieve the peak. Let’s first start with a reminder of the current situation (see table 4): the oil revenue 
is about 1% of Brazilian GDP.  
Table 2: Current oil revenues in Brazilian GDP 
 2008 2009 2010 
Oil revenues (in R$ Million) 37525 29557 27920 
%GDP 1.24% 0.93% 0.76% 
Source: Own elaboration data from ANP and IBGE 
We can analyze three different parameters: the oil production, the annual GDP growth rate and the oil 
price. A likely scenario, which is going to be our reference scenario, could be an annual GDP growth 
rate of 4.5%, an oil production of 6.5 Mb/d and a global oil price of 247$
41.
.Thus the oil revenues 
would be in this reference scenario at 273 660 Million R$, which would represent 4.2 % of the GDP in 
2035. 
We can now analyze how these three parameters can impact the rate of oil revenue in the Brazilian 
GDP. So fix two parameters, and we change the other one. 
Table 3: The oil revenue in Brazilian GDP in 2035 for different oil prices scenarios  
Oil price ($) 210 247 270 
Oil revenue (% GDP) 3.5% 4.2% 4.6% 
Table 4: The oil revenue in Brazilian GDP in 2035 for different oil production scenarios  
Production (Mb/d) 6 6.5 7 
Oil revenue (% GDP) 3.8% 4.2% 4.5% 
Table 5- The oil revenue in Brazilian GDP in 2035 for different GDP growth rate scenarios 
GDP Growth rate 3.50% 4.50% 5.5% 
Oil Revenue (% GDP) 4.8% 4.2% 3.6% 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
The rate of oil revenue participation in the Brazilian GDP seems that would be between 3.5% and 
4.8%. This range can be higher, between 2.8% and 5.7% if we take the two extreme cases, however 
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 The study shows that the cities have quite different capabilities to manage the resources. “In consideration of weak 
governance and low human capital accumulation, the possibilities to take advantage of the benefits from mining are 
limited” (Enriquez, 2007, page 18). 
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 Source: IAE 
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even if the oil industry will increase participation in the Brazilian economy it will not become a kind 
of oil country
42
.  
Nevertheless, the oil revenue will probably strongly increase. It explains the current debate on how 
to reallocate government take among the different government levels. And this is the only piece of the 
new oil regime in Brazil which is still under discussion. 
4.2.2 A new distribution of oil revenue 
We can observe the evolution of the participation of the different government levels in the government 
take according the law 9.478 (Law_9.478, 1997) applied until 2012. The figure 6 shows that the Union 
increased the government take when more productive fields (with special participations fees) started to 
produce. Nevertheless, as observed in the graphic a quite important part of the royalties and special 
participation is in the hand of states and municipalities. 
Figure 6: The participation of the different government levels in the royalties and special 
participation 
 
Source: Own elaboration data from (Afonso et al., 2010) 
Under the law 9.478 just the municipalities and states bordering the production field receives the 
royalties and special participation. It shows that there is a strong concentration of oil resources in some 
regions (and cities). The current distribution is concentrated in three states: Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo 
and Espirito Santos. Figure 7 shows the discrepancy between the share of the revenue received by the 
producing states, their population and their GDP. Moreover, as we can observe actually the main 
concentration of the Royalties and Special participations is in the state of Rio de Janeiro which 
concentrates more than 80% of the proved reserve
43, however, the Rio de Janeiro’s population is just 
around 10% of the total Brazilian population.  
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 For instance if we compare with the participation of oil in the Venezuela economy, where it represents around 30% of the 
GDP, we can expect a lower impact and better possibilities to mitigate the oil curse problems. 
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 Data from ANP, in 2010. 
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Figure 7: Distribution of oil revenue (in 2008) 
 
Source: Own elaboration data from (Afonso et al., 2011), ANP and IBGE 
The new law from November 2012 for the distribution of the government take among the different 
government levels was finally approved in march 2013 (Law_12.734, 2012).The new law resulted in a 
strong change: especially it would decrease the share of producing states and municipalities and 
increase the participation of non-producing state and municipalities in the total royalties and special 
participation. This change would be progressive starting in 2013 and change progressively until 2019. 
In the figure 8, the blue bares represents the percentage of royalties’ shares taken by each 
government level (Producing States, Producing Municipalities and Union) under the Law 9478. Note 
that non-producing states and municipalities do not get any share of royalties in this regime. The green 
and red barrels how the royalties will be shared among the government level according to the law 
project 2565. The red barrels show how it will be distributed in 2013 and the greens barrels show it 
would be distributed in 2019, after the progressive change. Note that under the new law, the non-
producing states and municipalities would receive parts of the royalties. It would be done through the 
formation of a fund with the revenue and shared among the cities and municipalities using the same 
rules of tax distribution. This fund use would be restricted to some pre-defined uses and they would 
present administrative accountability from where the rent is expended. It is a way to decrease the 
problems observed in the municipalities inefficient expenses, and on the other hand keep a level of 
decentralization in decision of the expenses.  
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Figure 8: Royalties split between government levels
44
 
 
Source: (Law_9.478, 1997) and (Law_project_2565, 2011) 
The figure 9 shows the change on the distribution of special participation among different government 
levels, and we observe the same tendency of the figure 8 a progressive decrease in the participation of 
producing state and municipalities and an increasing participation on non-producing states and 
municipalities. The same process of a common fund for the distribution of non-producing states and 
municipalities’ revenues is used to the revenue coming from special participation. 
Figure 9: Special participation split between government levels
45
 
 
Source: (Law_9.478, 1997) and (Law_project_2565, 2011) 
Therefore, the new rule for royalties and special participation will increase the share of the non-
producing states and the non-producing municipalities in comparison with the current law. However 
the share of the the producing states, municipalities and the Union will decrease. It doesn’t mean, 
however, a necessary decrease in the oil revenues because of the expected growth of oil production. 
This explains also the interest to introduce gradually the changes in the split of the oil revenue, to 
maintain a certain level of revenue for the producing states and municipalities until the new blocks 
start to produce. 
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 The value was calculated for offshore take into account the royalty fee of 10%. 
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It is worth to underline that under the PSA regime, the government take tool would change as it 
would include the profit oil and exclude the special participation. As consequence of this new 
mechanism we can expect an important increase in the participation of the Union in the government 
take even if it there is no other change in the division of royalties and special participation. As 
described before, in the PSA regime we will also have royalties. And we can expect that their 
distribution under the PSA regime will follow the same logic of the concession regime
46
. 
4.3 Assessment  
Brazilian has a diversified economy and oil even if it is becoming important is not and will not be the 
only main economic drive.
47
 At most, oil revenues will be about 5% of GDP in 2035. Nevertheless, 
measures have been taken to protect the economy against possible drawbacks of natural resource 
richness. 
The promotion of a social fund seems to be quite interesting measure as on the one hand it deals 
with the problem associated with over-load of foreign devises and on the other hand it gives incentives 
to promote more efficient expenses of the revenue. Lower volatility of the revenues allows longer term 
for investment and better rationalization of the efficient way to allocate the resources. The use of this 
funds to decrease the poverty and to adopt social measures can assure a more equilibrate growth to the 
country. 
The redistribution of royalties and special participation among government levels also is important 
as it will help to decrease the differences among the regions and it may decrease the inefficient 
expenses and local oil curse effects observed in the municipality level. However, it is still unclear how 
municipalities could be actually supervised. Under this new law the non-producing states and 
municipalities which will receive the revenue through the national funds which will be constrained in 
their use. Conversely, there is no change on the rules of using of the revenues received by the 
producing states and municipalities. And if the resources expenses are not well managed at the local 
level, negative effects would continue to exist. 
In a nutshell, the risk of a Brazilian oil curse is very likely to be nip in the bud. 
5. Conclusion 
Following the Pre-salt fields discovery the Brazilian government launched a series of changes in the 
law framing the hydrocarbons exploration and production (three of these laws were already approved 
and one is still waiting for president approval). 
We identified three different objectives for the changes contained in the laws: to increase the 
government take, to develop indigenous industry and to avoid the possible drawbacks resulting from 
the massive increase of petroleum rents (oil curse) 
The main instrument to increase the government take can be identified as the change of regime in 
the Pre-salt region, from concession regime to PSA regime. In this new regime, the government bears 
higher risks associated with the production cost, but it is likely to get higher revenue. On the other 
hand, the increase of government take may increase the challenges related to the oil curse. Another 
instrument put in place is the creation of PPSA. It may be seen as a complementary mechanism to the 
PSA. Under the new regime (PSA), the government take is a share of the project profit, which depends 
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 As we explained before it does not mean a real decrease in the Union share in the total government take. We can expect 
that the profit oil taken by the Union under the PSA regime will have an important weight in the total of the government 
take. 
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 In 2011, Brazil got the position of the world's sixth-largest economy.  
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on the project costs. In that view, PPSA will be the eyes of the government in order to guarantee cost 
minimization. On the other hand, PPSA can also be seen as a complementary instrument to the 
industrial policy that should be carried out by Petrobras. The PPSA, being able to monitor the 
decisions along the project development, would be able also to participate on the decisions about the 
technological choices. Thus, PPSA will be able to analyse and evaluate continuously whether the 
national or international technology should be chosen. 
However, the key instrument included in the new framing to drive an industrial policy in the gas 
and oil sectors is the Petrobras role. As a national company controlled by the government, Petrobras 
got the responsibility of including high national content in the outsourcing. On the one hand, any 
industrial policy to incentivize national production has a cost (at least in the short term). In that view, 
it could drive input prices up impact negatively the government take. On the other hand, the role of 
Petrobras as unique operator may raise a position of monopsony (or quasi monopsony) and it could 
push down the input prices, thus raising the government take. In other words, this policy will impact of 
the government take. Nevertheless, the final assessment of its cost and benefits will depend on the 
weight of the negative and the positive effects in the costs. 
In order to deal with the third objective (to avoid the oil curse), the government created a fund to 
manage the Union resources. This would avoid negative impact in the exchange rate, would avoid the 
misuse of the Union resources and would save resources for compensating next generations. 
Moreover, a new law, currently under discussion, would redistribute the participation of States and 
Municipalities and also would create constraint mechanisms to avoid misuse of the oil rent. 
This new regulatory framework gives much more flexibility for the government to act to drive the 
country development (through the increase role of Petrobras and the creation of PPSA). Nevertheless, 
how the government will use this flexibility is key to the success or failure of this regulatory 
framework. It is important to have a long run strategy. Taking into account the large economic and 
political uncertainties over the next 20 years, the multilevel public intervention could be seen as a 
caution approach. There are several instruments in the new regulatory regime for the Brazilian 
government to intervene. This does not mean they will be fully used, nor even more so badly used. 
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